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RESPONSE : DUE:

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
STATUS :

TO: GWC/DGC

FROM: DDI

REMARKS: AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION QUESTIONNAIRE ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OVERS

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DDI #00390-84/1
14 February 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:

STAT

[Redacted]
Associate General Counsel for
Intelligence Community Affairs

FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : American Bar Association Questionnaire on
Intelligence Community Oversight

I apologize for not meeting your deadline but offer the following proposed answers to questions appropriate to the DDI from the Standing Committee on Law and National Security of the ABA:

- 2c. There are a number of mechanisms to insure that sensitive collection efforts are focused on intelligence collection targets of true significance. At the highest level, the Senior Interdepartmental Group for Intelligence brings together the principal consumers of intelligence together with representatives of the intelligence community on a periodic basis through the year to examine detailed requirements lists and changing intelligence priorities. As part of this process each year the Intelligence Community, in consultation with policymakers, prepares a list of top priority issues -- collectively known as the National Intelligence Topics -- which guide both the collection and production process. The Intelligence Producers Council at the end of the year then prepares an assessment describing how well the Community has performed on each issue and identifies remaining gaps. Beyond this, there are standing committees of the intelligence community which over the years have become not only day to day managers of major collection systems but also play a key role in longer range targeting and collection priorities. Within the Directorate of Intelligence itself, there is a major component that serves as the intermediary between the collectors of all kinds of intelligence information and the production offices of the Directorate. Finally, there are additional mechanisms including a critical intelligence priorities committee to focus attention on particularly significant high priority projects.

- 4a. There are a number of mechanisms to address the timeliness, reliability and quality of intelligence. There include the analysis or production subcommittees of the two oversight committees of the Congress, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Senior Review Panel of the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Product Evaluation Staff of the Directorate of Intelligence/CIA. All of these organizations at one time or another conduct detailed evaluations of intelligence community or CIA performance on specific categories of intelligence, whether Soviet camouflage, concealment, and deception or Central America, or a range of past estimates. Additionally, CIA periodically will bring in a panel of outside specialists to review, evaluate and critique major categories of its analysis, such as Soviet defense spending estimates. Additionally, a new approach being explored by the Agency is to create small task forces composed of people from inside the Agency as well as cleared outsiders to review a substantive problem in a competitive way. The combined effect of all of these mechanisms helps to insure the best possible intelligence for policymakers by identifying the characteristics of strong performance as well as deficiencies and pinpointing areas for improvement.
- 4b. Many of the same mechanisms cited in 4a to insure that the US is obtaining quality intelligence also help to insure that analysis is as objective and as honest as it can be. Beyond these mechanisms, however, the surest safeguard of the integrity of the analytic process from political pressure or bias is the integrity of the analysts and their managers themselves. We must protect intelligence analysis in particular not only from political bias but try also to weed out bias on the part of the analysts themselves. The external mechanisms cited above help to insulate the process from outside political pressures and bias; a review process in which several supervisors are involved in clearing analysis for publication, the integrity of the individuals involved, and reliance on professional intelligence officers is the best protection against both external and internal bias.
- 4c. The mechanisms for independent evaluation of the quality of intelligence are essentially the same as those cited in 4a.



Robert M. Gates

OGC 84-1120
13 January 1984

DDI- 0039084
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an answer to
DDI (see 2c)
4 (a bc)
DK

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Administration
✓ Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Inspector General
Comptroller
Director, Office of Legislative Liaison

FROM:


Associate General Counsel for
Intelligence Community Affairs

SUBJECT:

American Bar Association Questionnaire on
Intelligence Community Oversight

1. The General Counsel has been asked to respond to a request from the Standing Committee on Law and National Security of the American Bar Association. The Committee is engaged in a study of oversight and accountability in the Intelligence Community. The accompanying correspondence explains the nature and purpose of that study, and includes a questionnaire soliciting the General Counsel's views and comments.

2. Mr. Sporkin has asked me to review the questionnaire and to solicit your views and suggestions. The response decided upon will represent his personal views, and thus will disclaim any intent to represent the Agency's position. However, we feel it would be of great benefit to have your thoughts and perceptions on these important issues.

3. In order to prepare a complete response by the requested deadline, I would appreciate any input you may wish to provide by 31 January. As you may know, the Standing Committee on Law and National Security of the American Bar Association has been a strong supporter of U.S. intelligence efforts. We hope that, by providing an informed (albeit personal) response on the subject of intelligence oversight and accountability, we can favorably influence any recommendations the Committee makes or the positions it takes. Please contact me (x7541) if you have any questions.

STAT

cc: DDCI
ExDir